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Abstract. From 24.06. to 29.06.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07261 Fair
Division was held in the International Conference and Research Cen-
ter (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants
presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems
were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar
as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this
paper. The ﬁrst section describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Economics, Fairness, Allocation, Political Science
07261 Summary  Fair Division
The problem of fair division-dividing goods or "bads" (e.g., costs) among enti-
ties in an impartial and equitable way-is one of the most important problems
that society faces. A Google search on the phrase "fair allocation" returns over
100K links, referring to the division of sports tickets, health resources, com-
puter networking resources, voting power, intellectual property licenses, costs of
environmental improvements, etc.
Keywords: Economics, Fairness, Allocation, Political Science
Joint work of: Brams, Steven J.; Pruhs, Kirk; Woeginger, Gerhard
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1243
The Geometry of Eﬃcient Fair Division
Julius B. Barbanel (Union College - Schenectady, USA)
We consider the problem of dividing a cake" C among n players. Our cake C
is a measure space on which each player uses a countably additive non-atomic
probability measure to evaluate pieces of cake, i.e., measurable subsets of the
measure space.
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We consider two natural geometric structures that one can associate with
this situation. One we call the Individual Pieces Set, or IPS, and the other we
call the Radon-Nikodym Set, or RNS.
Let us suppose that the measures used by the players are m1,m2, . . . ,mn.
The IPS is the set
{〈m1(P1),m2(P2), . . . ,mn(Pn)〉 : 〈P1, P2, . . . , Pn〉 is a partition of C into measurable subsets}
Deﬁne a new measure µ = m1 +m2 + . . . +mn. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
let fi : C → R be the Radon-Nikodym derivative of mi with respect to µ. Then,
for each such i and any measurable A ⊆ C, mi =
∫
A
fidµ and, for every a ∈ C,
f1(a) + f2(a) + . . . + fn(a) = 1 (except possibly on a measure zero set). Let
S denote the standard simplex in Rn (i.e., S = {〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 : each xi ≥
0 and x1+x2+. . .+xn = 1}). For each a ∈ C, we deﬁne f(a) = 〈f1(a), f2(a), . . . , fn(a)〉.
Then (after redeﬁning on a set of measure zero if necessary), for every such a,
f(a) ∈ S, and so f is a function from C to S. Intuitively, f(a) describes the
relative worth that each player attaches to a, as compared to the other players.
The RNS is the set {f(a) : a ∈ C}.
We will discuss how envy-freeness, Pareto maximality, and other fairness and
eﬃciency properties are reﬂected in the IPS, in the RNS, and in the interaction
between these two structures.
Keywords: Fair division, envy-free, Pareto maximal
Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy
Cake-Cutting Procedure
Steven Brams (New York University, USA)
Properties of discrete cake-cutting procedures that use a minimal number of cuts
(n - 1 if there are n players) are analyzed. None is always envy-free or eﬃcient,
but divide-and-conquer (D& C) minimizes the maximum number of players that
any single player may envy. It works by asking n ? 2 players successively to place
marks on a cake that divide it into equal or approximately equal halves, then
halves of these halves, and so on. Among other properties, D& C (i) ensures play-
ers of more than 1/n shares if their marks are diﬀerent and (ii) is strategyproof
for risk-averse players. However, D& C may not allow players to obtain propor-
tional, connected pieces if they have unequal entitlements. Possible applications
of D& C to land division are brieﬂy discussed.
Keywords: Cake-cutting, proportionality, envy-freeness, eﬃciency, strategy-
proofness
Joint work of: Brams, Steven J.; Jones, Michael A.; Klamler, Christian
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1221
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Cake Cutting Really is Not a Piece of Cake and Balanced
Allocations of Cake
Jeﬀ Edmonds (York University - Toronto, CA)
We consider the well-known cake cutting problem in which a protocol wants to
divide a cake among n ≥ 2 players in such a way that each player believes that
they got a fair share. The standard Robertson-Webb model allows the protocol
to make two types of queries, Evaluation and Cut, to the players. A deterministic
divide-and-conquer protocol with complexity O(n log n) is known.
We provide the ﬁrst an Ω(n log n) lower bound on the complexity of any de-
terministic protocol in the standard model. This improves previous lower bounds,
in that the protocol is allowed to assign to a player a piece that is a union of
intervals and only guarantee approximate fairness. We accomplish this by lower
bounding the complexity to ﬁnd, for a single player, a piece of cake that is both
rich in value, and thin in width. We then introduce a version of cake cutting in
which the players are able to cut with only ﬁnite precision. In this case, we can
extend the Ω(n log n) lower bound to include randomized protocols.
We give a randomized algorithm for the well known caking cutting problem
that achieves approximate fairness, and has complexity O(n).
The heart of this this result involves extending the standard oine multiple-
choice balls and bins analysis to the case where the underlying resources/bins/machi-
nes have diﬀerent utilities to diﬀerent players/balls/jobs.
Keywords: Cake Cutting nlogn lower bound and O(n) upper bound
Joint work of: Edmonds, Jeﬀ; Pruhs, Kirk
Equilibria for two parallel links: The strong price of
anarchy versus the price of anarchy
Leah Epstein (University of Haifa, IL)
Following recent interest in the "strong price of anarchy" SPOA), we consider
this measure, as well as the well known "price of anarchy" (POA) for the job
scheduling problem on two uniformly related parallel machines (or links). The
atomic players are the jobs, and the delay of a job is the completion time of the
machine running it. The social goal is to minimize the maximum delay of any
job. Thus the cost (or social cost) in this case is the makespan of the schedule.
The selﬁsh goal of each job is to minimize its delay, i.e., the delay of the machine
that it chooses to run on.
A pure Nash equilibrium is a schedule where no job can obtain a smaller
delay by selﬁshly moving to a diﬀerent conﬁguration (machine), while other jobs
remain in their original positions. A strong equilibrium is a schedule where no
(non-empty) subset of jobs exists, where all jobs in this subset can beneﬁt from
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changing their conﬁguration. We say that all jobs in a subset beneﬁt from moving
to a diﬀerent machine if all of them have a strictly smaller delay as a result of
moving (while the other jobs remain in their positions, and may possibly have a
larger delay as a result).
The SPOA is the worst case ratio between the social cost of a (pure) strong
equilibrium and the cost of an optimal assignment, that is, the minimum achiev-
able social cost. The POA is a standard measure which takes into account not
only strong equilibria but any (pure) equilibrium. These two measures consoli-
date and give the same results for some problems, whereas for other problems,
the SPOA gives much more meaningful results than the POA.
We study the behavior of the SPOA versus the behavior of the POA for this
scheduling problem and give tight results for both these measures. We ﬁnd the
exact SPOA for any possible speed ratio s ≥ 1 of the machines, and compare it
to the exact POA which we also ﬁnd. We show that for a wide range of speeds
ratios these two measures are very diﬀerent (1.618 < s < 2.247), whereas for
other values of s, these two measures give the exact same bound. We extend all
our results for cases where a machine may have an initial load resulting from
jobs that can only be assigned to this machine, and show tight bounds on the
SPOA and the POA for three such variants as well.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium, uniformly related machyines
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1222
Competitive Queue Management for Latency Sensitive
Packets
Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv University, IL)
We consider the online problem of non-preemptive queue management. An on-
line sequence of packets arrive, each of which has an associated intrinsic value.
Packets can be accepted to a FIFO queue, or discarded. The proﬁt gained by
transmitting a packet diminishes over time and is equal to its value minus the
delay.
This corresponds to the well known and strongly motivated Naor's model in
operations research.
We give a queue management algorithm with a competitive ratio equal to the
golden ratio (φ ≈ 1.618) in the case that all packets have the same value, along
with a matching lower bound. We also derive Θ(1) upper and lower bounds on
the competitive ratio when packets have diﬀerent intrinsic values (in the case
of diﬀerentiated services). We can extend our results to deal with more general
models for loss of value over time.
Finally, we re-interpret our online algorithms in the context of selﬁsh agents,
producing an online mechanism that approximates the optimal social welfare to
within a constant factor.
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Object Division by Market Procedures
Claus-Jochen Haake (Universität Bielefeld, D)
We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute ﬁnitely many objects
among themselves. The conﬂict is resolved by means of a market procedure.
Roughly, in a market procedure, we specify price(s) for the objects to be divided
and the ﬁnal allocation is achieved by individual demand. Therefore, negotiations
over the ﬁnal allocation can be replaced by letting agents buy their favorite
bundles.
Depending on the speciﬁcations, the procedure serves to implement bargain-
ing solutions such as the discrete Raiﬀa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superad-
ditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a
speciﬁc source of conﬂict potential.
In the second paper, we use the idea of attaching prices to objects to reach
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, or, put diﬀerently, the Adjusted Winner point,
through strategic interaction. We construct two games for two persons, in which
the AW allocation prevails in Nash and subgame perfect equilibrium, respec-
tively. The games again rely on an underlying market for objects, in which prices
are speciﬁed in a an appropriate way.
Envy in Experiments
Dorothea Herreiner (Loyola Marymount University, USA)
This talk discusses diﬀerent notions of envy and the empirical evidence for their
relevance for distributive justice.
In particular, it links the concept of envy freeness to the recent experimental
and survey-based literature on fair division.
Keywords: Fairness, Envy, Experiments
Some Recent Results on Pie Cutting
Michael A. Jones (Montclair State University, USA)
In 1993, David Gale suggested that there is a diﬀerence between the fair division
of a cake and a pie. The diﬀerence between a cake and a pie is topological:
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A cake can be viewed as a rectangle valued along its horizontal axis - a line
segment, while a pie is viewed as a disk valued along its circumference - a circle.
A cake can be turned into a pie if the endpoints of the line segment are identiﬁed.
In this talk, I will provide a survey of some recent results on pie-cutting.
Vertical, parallel cuts divide a cake into pieces, and radial cuts from the center
divide a pie into wedge-shaped pieces. We restrict our attention to allocations
that use the minimal number of cuts necessary to divide cakes or pies. Gale
also asked a simple question: Does there always exist an envy-free and eﬃcient
allocation of a pie? An allocation of pie into n wedge-shaped sectors among n
players is
 envy-free if no player prefers another sector to her own, and
 eﬃcient if, based on each player's measure, every other possible allocation
of sectors either gives the same values or else decreases the value assigned
to at least one player (in which "eﬃcient" is among other allocations into n
sectors).
For two players, Barbanel and Brams (2007) answer Gale's question and provide
the condition on the players' preferences for an envy-free, eﬃcient, and equitable
allocation to exist, in which equitable means that each player assigns the same
value to the sector that she receives. Thomson (2007) also answers Gale's ques-
tion in the aﬃrmative for two players. Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) extend
the deﬁnition of envy-freeness to unequal entitlements, in which one player is
entitled to p of the pie while the other is entitled to 1− p, and use the Univer-
sal Chord Theorem to prove that an eﬃcient, envy-free, proportional allocation
exists for two players.
The existence of an allocation with speciﬁc properties does not imply a pro-
cedure whereby the players would truthfully reveal their preferences to arrive at
the allocation. Barbanel and Brams (2007) provide a two-player, moving-knife
procedure that yields an envy-free and eﬃcient allocation when the players'
measures are absolutely continuous with respect to one another. They provide a
three-player, moving-knife procedure that produces an allocation that is envy-
free, but need not be eﬃcient nor equitable. Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007)
provide a two-player, moving-knife procedure that yields a rational, proportional
outcome that will almost assuredly leave a surplus, thereby guaranteeing that
the allocation is not eﬃcient. A more information-intensive procedure requiring
a referee yields a proportional, envy-free, and eﬃcient allocation.
For n > 2 players, the results are less positive. Brams, Jones, and Klamler
(2007) provide examples for three players that demonstrate that proportional
allocations may fail to exist when entitlements are not equal. Barbanel and
Brams (2007) demonstrate measures for four players (with equal entitlements) in
which no envy-free, eﬃcient allocation of pie exists; their solution requires that
the measures are not absolutely continuous with respect to one another. The
aforementioned examples for three or four players can be naturally extended to
more players. I will conclude with a list of open questions.
I will discuss results from the following papers:
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 Barbanel and Brams, "Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake." (Preprint, 2007)
 Brams, Jones, and Klamler, "Proportional pie-cutting." (Preprint, 2007)
http://www.csam.montclair.edu/jonesma/pie-cutting.pdf
 Thomson, "Children crying at birthday parties. Why?" Economic Theory
31 (2007) 501-521.
Keywords: Pie cutting, procedures, Universal Chord Theorem
See also: Thomson, "Children crying at birthday parties. Why?" Economic
Theory 31 (2007) 501-521.
Some Recent Results on Pie Cutting
Michael A. Jones (Montclair State University, USA)
For cake cutting, cuts are parallel to an axis and yield rectangular pieces. As
such, cutting a cake is viewed as dividing a line segment. For pie cutting, cuts are
radial from the center of a disc to the circumference and yield sectors or wedge-
shaped pieces. As such, cutting a pie is viewed as dividing a circle. There is
clearly a relationship between cutting a cake and cutting a pie. Once a circular
pie has a single cut, then it can be straightened out into a segment, looking
like a cake. Isn't a cake just a pie that has been cut? Gale (1993) suggested
that this topology was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. This note is to summarize and
compare some of the recent results on pie cutting that appear in Barbanel and
Brams (2007) and Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007). The geometric framework
presented in Barbanel and Brams (2007) is used to prove and to explain results
in Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007).
Keywords: Pie cutting, envy-free, proportional, undominated
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1224
Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing
Haim Kaplan (Tel Aviv University, IL)
As deﬁned by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that
is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price
of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds
for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k, for
unrelated machines.
Keywords: Game theory, Strong Nash equilibria, Load balancing, Price of
Anarchy
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Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1225
Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments
Todd R. Kaplan (University of Exeter, GB)
Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting
payment in return. This may pose a diﬃcult problem when the allocator does not
know the values or needs of the agents receiving those goods. We ﬁrst discuss a
mechanism from Brams and Kaplan (2004) for allocating several heterogeneous
goods among two parties. This mechanism combines sequential choices with
a structured form of trading. We then talk about the case (Chakravarty and
Kaplan, 2007) where the agents have private information (do not know each
others' preferences), objects are homogeneous, and the agents can send a costly
but wasteful signal to the designer. We show that for a large class of distributions
of valuations, ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share (or using
lotteries if the goods are indivisible) maximizes the social surplus. In other cases,
those that send the highest signal should receive the goods; however, we then
show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior.
Multicast cost sharing and Nash equilibria
Claire Kenyon-Mathieu (Brown Univ. - Providence, USA)
We consider a multicast game played by a set of selﬁsh noncooperative players
(i.e., nodes) on a rooted undirected graph. Players arrive one by one and each
connects to the root by greedily choosing a path minimizing its cost; the cost
of using an edge is split equally among all users of the edge. How large can
the sum of the players' costs be, compared to the cost of a "socially optimal"
solution, deﬁned to be a minimum Steiner tree connecting the n players to the
root? We show that the ratio is at least logarithmic in n and at most squared
logarithmic. One can view this multicast game as a variant of online Steiner tree
with a diﬀerent cost sharing mechanism.
Furthermore, we consider what happens if the players, in a second phase, are
allowed to change their paths in order to decrease their costs. Thus, in the second
phase players play best response dynamics until eventually a Nash equilibrium
is reached. We show that the price of anarchy is at least logarithmic and at most
the cube of logarithmic.
Joint work of: Charikar, Moses; Karloﬀ, Howard; Kenyon-Mathieu, Claire;
Naor, Seﬃ; Saks, Michael
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The Housemates' Problem
Marc Kilgour (Wilfrid Laurier University, CA)
A house with n rooms is rented by n housemates. The Housemates' Problem asks
whether it is possible to assign rents to the individual rooms, totaling the rent
for the house, so that each housemate prefers a diﬀerent room. The Housemates'
Problem was proposed and elaborated, and several solutions developed, in six
papers published between 1999 and 2004. These papers are reviewed in this
presentation, and several directions for further development are suggested.
Keywords: Fair division, preference, bid matrix, feasible assignment, maxsum
assignment
Better Ways to Cut a Cake - Revisited
Christian Klamler (Universität Graz, A)
Procedures to divide a cake among n people with n-1 cuts (the minimum number)
are analyzed and compared. For 2 persons, cut-and-choose, while envy-free and
eﬃcient, limits the cutter to exactly 50% if he or she is ignorant of the chooser's
preferences, whereas the chooser can generally obtain more. By comparison, a
new 2-person surplus procedure (SP'), which induces the players to be truthful in
order to maximize their minimum allocations, leads to a proportionally equitable
division of the surplus - the part that remains after each player receives 50% -
by giving each person a certain proportion of the surplus as he or she values it.
For n ≥ 3 persons, a new equitable procedure (EP) yields a maximally equi-
table division of a cake. This division gives all players the highest common value
that they can achieve and induces truthfulness, but it may not be envy-free.
The applicability of SP' and EP to the fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible
good, like land, is brieﬂy discussed.
Keywords: Fair division, cake-cutting, envy-freeness, strategy-proofness
Joint work of: Brams, Steven; Jones, Michael; Klamler, Christian
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1227
Approximating min-max k-clustering
Asaf Levin (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IL)
We consider theproblems of set partitioning into k clusters with minimum of
the maximum cost of a cluster. The cost function is given by an oracle, and we
assume that it satisﬁes some natural structural constraints.
10 S. J. Brams, K. Pruhs and G. Woeginger
That is, we assume that the cost function is monotone, the cost of a singleton
is zero, and we assume that for all S ∩S′ 6= ∅ the following holds c(S) + c(S′) ≥
c(S ∪ S′). For this problem we present a (2k − 1)-approximation algorithm for
k ≥ 3, a 2-approximation algorithm for k = 2, and we also show a lower bound
of k on the performance guarantee of any polynomial-time algorithm.
We then consider special cases of this problem arising in vehicle routing
problems, and present improved results.
Keywords: Approximation algorithms
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1228
Self-interested players in repeated games: Minimizing
regret
Katrina Ligett (CMU - Pittsburgh, USA)
While in some situations, games are mediated by a central authority who can
attempt to maximize fairness or other notions of social welfare, in many systems,
players interact in a game, and the social welfare achieved is determined solely
by the strategies they employ.
For this reason, it is interesting to study the outcomes achieved by players
operating in a self-interested manner in various settings.
Recent work in computer science has attempted to study self-interested be-
havior by quantifying the ratio between the social value achieved by the worst
Nash equilibrium and that of the social optimum. In this talk, we present an
alternative deﬁnition of self-interested behavior in games, that of minimizing re-
gret. We present some new results quantifying the global consequences of regret-
minimizing strategies in a variety of classes of games, focusing in particular on
a market game where the social utility function is a measure of fairness.
In this talk, we consider a repeated game played on a ﬁxed graph, where
on each timestep, each of the players must select a node in the graph to play.
A player's reward is the number of nodes to which she is the closest player
(in case of ties, they split the credit). For example, the nodes might be tourist
destinations in Paris and the players might be souvenir sellers deciding where to
set up their stands. Their income is based on the number of tourists (nodes) who
buy from them (in this example, tourists always buy from the nearest stand).
The social utility is the minimum player utility, so social welfare is maximized
when all players achieve the same utility. One way to maximize social welfare is
for all k players to place their stands on a single location and thus split the n
tourists evenly, giving social welfare n/k. This clearly need not be an equilibrium.
However, we are able to show that the worst Nash equilibrium can be no worse
than n/2(k-1), and regret-minimizing algorithms achieve the same guarantee,
even though they need not converge.
Keywords: Regret-minimization, game theory, repeated games, online games,
price of anarchy
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Roth, Aaron
On Approximately Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
Evangelos Markakis (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of
people from an algorithmic perspective.
Fair division has been a central topic in the economic literature and several
concepts of fairness have been suggested. The criterion that we focus on is envy-
freeness. In our model, a monotone utility function is associated with every player
specifying the value of each subset of the goods for the player. An allocation is
envy-free if every player prefers her own share than the share of any other player.
When the goods are divisible, envy-free allocations always exist. In the pres-
ence of indivisibilities, we show that there exist allocations in which the envy is
bounded by the maximum marginal utility, and present a simple algorithm for
computing such allocations. We then look at the optimization problem of ﬁnding
an allocation with minimum possible envy. In the general case the problem is
not solvable or approximable in polynomial time unless P = NP. We consider
natural special cases (e.g. additive utilities) which are closely related to a class
of job scheduling problems.
Approximation algorithms as well as inapproximability results are obtained.
Finally we investigate the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for produc-
ing allocations with bounded envy.
Keywords: Envy-free, Fair division, approximation algorithms




See also: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, New York, NY, May 2004
Eﬃcient cost sharing with a cheap residual claimant
Hervé Moulin (Rice University - Houston, USA)
For the cooperative production problem where the commons is a one dimensional
convex cost function, I propose the residual mechanism to implement the eﬃ-
cient production level . In contrast to the familiar cost sharing methods such as
serial, average and incremental, the residual mechanism may subsidize an agent
with a null demand. IFor a large class of smooth cost functions, the residual
mechanism generates a budget surplus that is, even in the worst case, vanishes
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as 1/logn where n is the number of participants. Compare with the serial, av-
erage and incremental mechanisms, of which the budget surplus, in the worst
case, converges to the eﬃcient surplus as n grows.
The second problem is the assignment among n agents of p identical objects
and cash transfers to compensate the losers. We assume p<n, and compute the
optimal competitive performance among all VCG mechanisms generating no
budget deﬁcit. It goes to zero exponentially fast in n if the number of objects is
ﬁxed; and as (n)(1/2) uniformly in p. The mechanism generates envy, and net
utilities are not co-monotonic to valuations. When p > n/2, it may even fail to
achieve voluntary participation.
Keywords: Assignment, cost sharing, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, com-
petitive analysis
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1231
Adjusted Winner: Extensions to 3 or More People
Allison M. Pacelli (Williams College - Williamstown, USA)
Adjusted Winner is a procedure developed by Steven Brams and Alan Taylor
that guarantees an eﬃcient, equitable, and envy-free division of goods for two
people. For three or more people, it is not always possible to ﬁnd such an allo-
cation. Using mixed integer programming however, we are able to ﬁnd such a
solution if it exists. This is work in progress.
Keywords: Adjusted Winner
Joint work of: Pacelli, Allison M.; Craft, David L.
Fair Division and Uncertainties within Joint International
Trading Activities-Intelligent Resource Allocation and
Process Optimization within International Resource
Conﬂicts
Stefan Pickl (Univ. der Bundeswehr - Neubiberg, D)
The important conferences of Rio de Janeiro 1992 and Kyoto 1997 demand
for new economic instruments which focus on environmental protection in both
macro and micro economy. A sustainable development can only be guaranteed
if the instrument is embedded in an optimal strategic energy management and
in intelligent (fair) resource allocation principles. Game theoretic monitoring
and veriﬁcation instruments should be developed. Companies, operating within
national registry requirements, must have accurate and up-to-date inventories
and tools for tracking, analyzing, and reporting the data. Such ﬁnancial markets
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provide economic incentives for better management of GHG emissions. Tradable
credits are derived from certiﬁed reductions recorded over a period of time and
must be tracked and properly documented.
Thus, a successful trading system calls for fair division principles. The talk
gives an overview about this topic and present a few solution principles which
were developed by the author:
Game-theoretic solution concepts were theoretically deﬁned and practically
computed. Emission Trading Markets as general market situation can then be
examined. Preferences in the context of the Kyoto protocol were analysed in
real-world experiments. The results of those international experiments and fair
division techniques might lead to an optimal market design. In the next phase
the implementation of auctions will be treated and the computation of utility
functions in this important environment should be characterized.
Keywords: Fair Allocation, Process Optimization, Business Intelligence
An Approximation Algorithm for Max-Min Fair Allocation
of Indivisible Goods
Amin Saberi (Stanford University, USA)
I talk about the the ﬁrst approximation algorithm for the problem of max-min
fair allocation of indivisible goods. The approximation ratio of our algorithm
is 1/log3 k
√
k where k is the number of agents. As a part of our algorithm, we
design an iterative method for rounding a fractional matching on a tree which
might be of independent interest.
Joint work of: Saberi, Amin; Asadpour, Arash
Dynamic Pricing for Impatient Bidders
Baruch Schieber (IBM TJ Watson Research Center, USA)
We study the following problem related to pricing over time. Assume there is
a collection of bidders, each of whom is interested in buying a copy of an item
of which there is an unlimited supply. Every bidder is associated with a time
interval over which the bidder will consider buying a copy of the item, and a
maximum value the bidder is willing to pay for the item. On every time unit
the seller sets a price for the item. The seller's goal is to set the prices so as to
maximize revenue from the sale of copies of items over the time period.
In the ﬁrst model considered we assume that all bidders are impatient, that
is, bidders buy the item at the ﬁrst time unit within their bid interval that they
can aﬀord the price. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that
considers this model. In the oine setting we assume that the seller knows the
bids of all the bidders in advance. In the online setting we assume that at each
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time unit the seller only knows the values of the bids that have arrived before or
at that time unit. We give a polynomial time oine algorithm and prove upper
and lower bounds on the competitiveness of deterministic and randomized online
algorithms, compared with the optimal oine solution. The gap between the
upper and lower bounds is quadratic.
We also consider the envy free model in which bidders are sold the item
at the minimum price during their bid interval, as long as it is not over their
limit value. We prove tight bounds on the competitiveness of deterministic online
algorithms for this model, and upper and lower bounds on the competitiveness of
randomized algorithms with quadratic gap. The lower bounds for the randomized
case in both models use a novel general technique.
Keywords: Pricing, bid, envy free, online algorithm, competitive ratio
Preemptive Online Scheduling: Optimal Algorithms for
All Speeds
Jiri Sgall (Academy of Sciences - Prague, CZ)
We study an online version of the classical problem of preemptive scheduling
on uniformly related machines. We are given m machines with speeds and a
sequence of jobs, each described by its processing time (length). The time needed
to process a job with length p on a machine with speed s is p/s. In the preemptive
version, each job may be divided into several pieces, which can be assigned to
diﬀerent machines in disjoint time slots. The objective is to ﬁnd a schedule of
all jobs in which the maximal completion time (makespan) is minimized. In the
online problem, jobs arrive one-by-one and we need to assign each incoming job
to some time slots on some machines, without any knowledge of the jobs that
arrive later.
To compare with fair division problems, that also deal with inﬁnitely divisible
object and seek an even (or fair) allocation, here we also need to assign the
pieces to non-overlapping times. On the other hand, minimizing the number of
preemptions/cuts is not our objective.
Our main result is an optimal online algorithm for preemptive scheduling on
uniformly related machines with the objective to minimize makespan. The algo-
rithm is deterministic, yet it is optimal even among all randomized algorithms.
In addition, it is optimal for any ﬁxed combination of speeds of the machines,
and thus our results subsume all the previous work on various special cases.
Together with a new lower bound it follows that the overall competitive ratio of
this optimal algorithm is between 2.054 and e ≈ 2.718.
Keywords: Scheduling, preemption, makespan, online algorithms




See also: T. Ebenlendr, W. Jawor, J. Sgall: Preemptive Online Scheduling:
Optimal Algorithms for All Speeds. To appear in Algorithmica. A preliminary
version appeared in Proc. of the 14th European Symp. on Algorithms (ESA),
Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 4168, pages 327-339, Springer, 2006.
A Pie That Can't Be Cut Fairly
Walter Stromquist (Swarthmore College, USA)
David Gale asked in 1993 whether, when a pie is to be divided among n claimants,
it is always possible to ﬁnd a division that is both envy free and undominated
(Pareto optimal). The pie is cut along n radii, and the claimants preferences
are described by diﬀerent measures on the cake.
We answer Gale's question in the negative for n = 3 by exhibiting three
measures for which no division of the pie can be both envy free and undominated.
The measures are absolutely continuous with respect to each other and with
respect to area.
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1219
Envy-free cake divisions cannot be found by ﬁnite
protocols
Walter Stromquist (Swarthmore College, USA)
No ﬁnite protocol (even if unbounded) can guarantee an envy-free division of a
cake among three or more players, if each player is to receive a single connected
piece.
Keywords: Cake cutting, envy free, ﬁnite protocol
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1220
Cutting several cakes with linked preferences
Francis Edward Su (Harvey Mudd College, USA)
We present a method for addressing envy-free, multi-object division where the
items to be divided may have linked preferences. This method is based on viewing
the space of possible divisions as a triangulated space, and using a polytopal
version of Sperner's lemma.
Keywords: Topology, combinatorics, Sperner's lemma, fair division, envy-free
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Fair Division With Indivisible Items: Heuristic and Exact
Algorithms
William A. Webb (Washington State Univ. - Pullman, USA)
Given n indivisible items, how can they be partitioned among k people, in spec-
iﬁed ratios, in an optimal way. We give a survey of known results and indicate
some new method which are both more general and potentially lead to better
solutions.
Fictitious Play beats Simplex for fractional packing and
covering
Neal E. Young (Univ. California - Riverside, USA)
Linear programs with non-negative coeﬃcients are called fractional packing and
covering linear programs. In this talk I'll describe a fast (1+epsilon)-approximation
algorithm for such linear programs. For large instances, the algorithm is much
faster than the simplex method, even for small epsilon.
Keywords: Linear program, packing, covering, ﬁctitious play, Lagrangian re-
laxation, approximation algorithm
Joint work of: Koufogiannakis, Christos; Young, Neal E.
Maximizing the Minimum Load for Selﬁsch Agents
Rob van Stee (Universität Karlsruhe, D)
We consider the problem of maximizing the minimum load for machines that
are controlled by selﬁsh agents, who are only interested in maximizing their own
proﬁt. Unlike the classical load balancing problem, this problem has not been
considered for selﬁsh agents until now.
For a constant number of machines, m, we show a monotone polynomial time
approximation scheme (PTAS) with running time that is linear in the number
of jobs. It uses a new technique for reducing the number of jobs while remaining
close to the optimal solution. We also present an FPTAS for the classical machine
covering problem, i.e., where no selﬁsh agents are involved (the previous best
result for this case was a PTAS) and use this to give a monotone FPTAS.
Additionally, we give a monotone approximation algorithm with approxima-
tion ratio min(m, (2 + ε)s1/sm) where ε > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small
and si is the (real) speed of machine i. Finally we give improved results for two
machines.
Keywords: Scheduling, algorithmic mechanism design, maximizing minimum
load
Joint work of: Epstein, Leah; van Stee, Rob
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1242
